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There is a growing awareness that farmland provides a host 
of nonmarket services, or amenities. Amenities are external 
benefits of farmland, i.e., beyond commodity production 
revenues, accruing to all types of residents (or “amenity 
consumers”) in rural, suburban, and urban areas. Farmland 
amenities may include aesthetically pleasing views, habitat 
provision, groundwater recharge, and a lack of develop-
ment (Irwin, Nickerson and Libby 2003). Although not 
necessarily amenities, farmland also provides closely related 
environmental benefits such as flood control and carbon 
sequestration (Legg 2007). The term “multifunctionality” 
reflects all of these services from active farmland: commod-
ities, amenities, and other environmental services.
Land–use change threatens future amenity provision. 
At the rural–urban fringe, high–value development often 
outbids agricultural land uses. The public perceives conver-
sion as too rapid, or poorly planned, and worries about 
reduced amenities. Strong political support exists for pol-
icy solutions, and some policies make cash payments to 
landowners in exchange for amenity provision. But are the 
benefits of preservation policy larger than the costs? An im-
portant step in assessing and improving the policy process 
is the proper valuation of amenities.
At least 28 different types of policies exist to retain ag-
ricultural land use in the United States  (Duke and Lynch 
2006). Some of these policies simply alter zoning, chang-
ing land–use rules to encourage farming or to discourage 
development.  Governments  use  incentive–based  policies 
to  subsidize  agricultural  uses  (use–value  tax  assessment) 
or to penalize conversion activities (impact fees and exac-
tions). The public is likely most familiar with participatory 
policies, through which governments enter land markets to 
expand demand for agricultural land use. The purchase of 
agricultural conservation easements (PACE) is the flagship 
participatory policy. Under PACE, governments buy nega-
tive easements to prevent development and, in effect, create 
market demand for amenities where little or none existed 
before. By 2004, over $1.6 billion had been spent in the 
United States on PACE (American Farmland Trust 2004).
The Economic Union (EU). also has an extensive set of 
policies that affect amenity provision (Bell 2007). Unlike 
the U.S., the EU has more unified multifunctional policies 
that address both soil/water management and land pres-
ervation, and also may include rural development provi-
sions (Bell 2007; von Haaren and Bills 2007). Yet in both 
the United States and the EU policymakers face the chal-
lenge of balancing regulatory restrictions with payments to 
landowners and find that existing policies are not always 
perceived to be effective by the public (von Haaren and 
Bills 2007). U.S. and EU policies are somewhat difficult to 
compare because U.S. policies that directly affect amenity 
provision tend to emanate from the state and local levels. 
The EU has cross–compliance standards in their agri–en-
vironmental policies and other norms that allow for sys-
tematic comparisons of policy effectiveness, especially re-
garding pollution prevention but also related to amenity 
provision (Brouwer and Jongeneel 2007).
Unfortunately, in the United States and the EU there 
appears  to  be  a  large  disconnect  between  research  and 
Conservation easements are legal instruments that restrict landown-
ers from pursuing developed land uses—typically, the wholesale 
conversion from agricultural and natural land uses to residential and 
commercial uses. Legally, conservation easements are “negative” ease-
ments in that they prevent the easement seller (the landowner) from 
using his or her land in a specified manner. Conservation easements do 
not give the easement buyer (governmental agencies, land trusts, etc.) 
the right to use the easement seller’s land; they only prevent uses. The 
easement seller thereby retains all other use rights typically associated 
with agricultural and natural land ownership. 
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policy  regarding  the  measurement 
and use of amenity values. It is use-
ful  to  clarify  exactly  what  amenity 
valuation  research  can  and  cannot 
provide to policy makers. This paper 
summarizes both research results and 
remaining research challenges, and it 
guides policy makers in interpreting 
research  results.  The  impact  of  re-
search on policy is the exclusive focus 
of the concluding section.
Research on Amenity Values
The market price of a land parcel 
does  not  capture  its  amenity  value. 
Economists  view  such  situations  as 
market failures because society’s de-
mand  for  amenities  does  not  affect 
the price of land when a farm is sold 
for  development.  Nonmarket  valu-
ation measures amenity value using 
revealed preference and stated prefer-
ence techniques. Revealed preference 
studies use transaction data on mar-
ket goods, which are associated with 
a nonmarket good, to infer amenity 
values. Stated preference studies use 
formal  survey  protocols  to  estimate 
amenity  values  directly,  typically 
targeting amenities that have public 
good characteristics and thus are in-
dependent of observed market choic-
es.  This  article  focuses  on  evidence 
from the latter, and does not address 
complications  associated  with  nega-
tive impacts from agriculture (see Poe 
1997; Bell 2007; Legg 2007).
A recent review finds that amenity 
values are affected by parcel size, lo-
cal scarcity of farmland, development 
pressure, land productivity, the inten-
sity of farming, and whether food is 
produced  for  human  consumption 
(Bergstrom  and  Ready  2009).  In  a 
Choices  article  on  amenity  values, 
Irwin, Nickerson and Libby (2003) 
argue that some farmland–preserva-
tion benefits are unrelated to farm-
ing.  Indeed,  the  public  values  the 
continuation  of  farming  and  long–
term  food  security,  but  it  also  val-
ues the provision of wildlife habitat, 
groundwater protection, and growth 
controls. These benefits tend to vary 
by location. Hence, in some locations 
the highest amenity value lands may 
be the most productive, or “prime,” 
farmland, while in others they will be 
more marginal but with more rural 
or environmental amenities (Irwin et 
al. 2003; Duke and Johnston 2007). 
Even urban areas may deliver high–
value amenities and lower value, low-
er acreage production (Adelaja, Lake 
and Colunga-Garcia 2007).
Challenges and Alternative Ap-
proaches
Accurately measuring amenity values 
is important for developing effective 
policy,  especially  when  these  values 
are used to justify payments to land-
owners. This section describes current 
research challenges in terms of accu-
racy of valuations and in explaining 
spatial and other preference patterns.
Do We Have Accurate Measures of Ame-
nity Value?
Research  on  amenity  values  offers 
many results and relentlessly refines 
its methods to test and improve sur-
vey instruments and statistical tech-
niques.  However,  measurement  ac-
curacy remains a persistent challenge. 
Recent studies are the most accurate 
because  they  better  capture  current 
conditions  and  are  most  likely  to 
have used the most recent techniques. 
Choice experiments provide a good 
example of the latter claim. Choice 
experiments are a generalized form of 
contingent valuation in that they al-
low one to measure the separate con-
tributions to amenity value of a host 
of land attributes, such as parcel land 
use, parcel size, and growth pressure. 
The  results  of  choice  experiments 
increase  the  diversity  of  parcels  to 
which estimated amenity values can 
be applied. 
Do We Understand How Amenity Values 
Vary across Space?
Explaining  how  amenity  values 
change  across  the  landscape  chal-
lenges current methods. Studies using 
“distance–decay” find evidence about 
What are the �ey research findings on amenity values? Irwin, Nic�erson and Libby (2003) report that 
demand for farmland amenities:
•	 Rises with income levels.
•	 Increases with educational attainment levels.
•	 Increases with population growth, especially near the rural–urban fringe.
•	 Increases as agricultural land becomes scarcer.
•	 Decreases when other nonfarm, rural lands are abundant. 
•	 	 Is higher for those located near preserved parcels, except when too many nonagricultural resi-
dences are nearby.
Figure 2. Key Research Findings on Farmland Amenities
Du�e and Johnston (200) calculate farmland amenity values for Delaware residents and for an as-
sortment of land uses. The following are examples for parcels in Delaware at high ris� of development 
and where preservation is conducted using a state–purchased conservation easement:
•	 Forest providing moderate levels of public access    $131,881 per acre
•	 Cropland with no public access      $4,91 per acre
•	 Nursery providing moderate levels of public access    $11,98 per acre
Du�e and Johnston (200) also find that amenity values differ when parcels are at a low ris� of 
development. 
•	 Cropland with no public access      $2,233 per acre
•	 Cropland with high levels of public access      $,132 per acre
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how values decline as residents are lo-
cated farther from the preserved site 
(e.g., Bateman and Langford 1997). 
Using voting data, Bell (2007) also 
finds  a  distance  impact.  These  and 
other  studies  suggest  that  amenity 
values may often extend beyond the 
boundaries of the political unit pro-
posing  preservation—a  potential 
complication to policy (e.g., Loomis 
2000). For instance, if Connecticut 
is proposing to fund the preservation 
of 10,000 acres of farmland but the 
benefits extend to residents of Rhode 
Island and Massachusetts, then pres-
ervation  may  be  undersupplied  be-
cause Connecticut will tend to only 
fund a program that meets its own 
needs.  More  effective  policies  must 
reflect the entire population holding 
values for preservation.
Do We Understand Patterns in Amenity 
Value? 
Other research suggests that patterns 
are more complicated than just dis-
tance.  Land  preservation  amenities 
have many public–good characteris-
tics. Once supplied, these services are 
supplied to everyone (without dimi-
nution) and no one can be precluded 
from  enjoying  them.  This  is  espe-
cially true when a “nonuser” enjoys 
the  amenities,  i.e.,  one  who  values, 
say, knowing that groundwater qual-
ity is protected but never anticipates 
using  that  water  (Duke  and  John-
ston 2008). Some nonuser values are 
found to decay with distance while 
others appear immune to such decay. 
This  complicates  efforts  to  identify 
fully the population enjoying ameni-
ties and to measure, correctly, the spa-
tial patterns of value. Policy makers 
thus  will  have  difficulty  identifying 
the full set of beneficiaries associated 
with preservation.
Are Amenity Values Valid beyond the 
Locality Where Data Were Collected?
Some inconsistencies in amenity–val-
ue  patterns  have  been  documented 
(Irwin,  Nickerson  and  Libby  2003; 
Bergstrom and Ready 2009), and this 
seems to suggest that amenity values 
are highly site–specific (Legg 2007). 
This is intuitive—the housing market 
is  driven  by  the  maxim,  “location, 
location,  location,”  so  the  amenity 
market  should  be,  too.  Population 
characteristics,  geography,  and  local 
scarcities in land use will affect val-
ues  measured  at  different  locations. 
Residents in Rhode Island may value 
habitat provision from farmland pres-
ervation  more  than  those  in  Dela-
ware, whose interests are tied to water 
protection and perpetuating farming 
as a way of life. Similar stories could 
explain why values vary between local 
regions, states, or even countries. 
However, this complicates the use 
of  amenity  values  because  it  limits 
the  broader  applicability  of  applied 
research. Valuation research is a rea-
sonably  expensive  undertaking,  and 
efforts would have to be increased by 
many orders of magnitude if all ex-
isting preservation programs required 
amenity valuation measures of their 
own.  One  possible  solution  to  this 
policy problem is “benefit transfer,” 
or adapting existing research results 
to  new  contexts  (Rosenberger  and 
Phipps  2007).  This  research  sug-
gests that transferring values will be 
most accurate when the preservation 
sites  are  similar,  i.e.,  the  data  were 
collected  on  a  parcel  sharing  land 
market, population, and geographic 
characteristics with the parcel of un-
known  amenity  value  (Rosenberger 
and Phipps 2007). In addition, the 
likelihood of accurate transfer likely 
increases when the scale of preserva-
tion is similar, i.e., a community in 
one state was studied and values are 
being transferred to a similarly sized 
community.
Do Amenity Values Reflect the Variety of 
Preferences?
A  recent  methodological  advance, 
mixed logit econometric analysis, al-
lows  for  amenity–value  estimation 
that reflects the variety of preferences 
in a population. The main advantage 
of mixed logit is that the researcher 
can still examine the importance of 
various drivers of preference (i.e., the 
parameters) while also testing for het-
erogeneity in those drivers (i.e., the 
standard deviation of the parameters).   
For instance, researchers now can es-
timate, say, that 70% of the popula-
tion holds a positive value for dairy 
farm  amenities,  while  30%  holds  a 
negative value. Policy makers will in-
creasingly  find  researchers  reporting 
these more nuanced, more accurate, 
characterizations of amenity value. It 
will be a challenge for policy makers 
to determine how best to use these re-
sults to design policies.
Implications for Policy
The  preceding  section  clarifies  the 
current  state  of  amenity  valuation 
research  and  offers  some  ideas  for 
bridging the research–policy gap. This 
section explores the question, “What 
is to be done with amenity values?” 
This  question  has  received  minimal 
treatment from researchers, but with 
a proper understanding policy mak-
ers can appropriately employ amenity 
value measures to improve policy.
How Should Amenity Values Be Used in 
Benefit–Cost Analysis?
Amenity values are typically present-
ed as the benefits of preserving an acre 
(or hectare) of farmland with certain 
attributes (land use, risk of develop-
ment, etc.), i.e., $X/acre. Economists 
probably anticipate that policy mak-
ers will then conduct a single–parcel, 
benefit–cost  test.  With  preservation 
costs  of  $Y/acre,  preservation  is  ef-
ficient if benefits exceed costs ($X > 
$Y). 
However,  many  policymakers 
want to know how much land should 
be preserved in total, across the juris-
diction, and amenity value research 
cannot  offer  much  guidance.  Ame-
nity value estimates are applicable to 
the next few parcels preserved. Large 
preservation  efforts  involving  many 
parcels will generate amenity values, 
per parcel, that are less than the re-
search calculated. The law of demand 14  CHOICES  4th Quarter 2008 • 23(4) 
tells economists to expect these lower 
values, but economists have little or 
no  understanding  of  how  fast  they 
will drop. There are several implica-
tions for policy. First, amenity values 
are  best  used  for  benefit–cost  tests 
or prioritization. Second, additional 
measurement  should  be  conducted 
after any major preservation effort has 
been implemented.
What Preservation Policy Should Be 
Used?
Amenity values should not automati-
cally  direct  policymakers  to  PACE. 
There is an urge to do so, probably 
because per–acre benefit measures are 
so easy to compare to the per–acre 
cost estimates for PACE with which 
policymakers are familiar. But there 
are economic and philosophical prob-
lems with this.
Economically, research finds that 
people also may value the preserva-
tion  policy  process  itself  (Johnston 
and Duke 2007). Amenity values may 
depend on whether they are delivered 
via  PACE,  by  outright  purchase  of 
the land, or by conservation zoning. 
Amenity values may also depend on 
whether governments or private land 
trusts provide preservation. Although 
conservation zoning tends to gener-
ate the lowest preservation benefits, it 
will also tend to be the least expensive 
(Johnston and Duke 2007). In addi-
tion,  Seidl,  Ellingson,  Magnan  and 
Mucklow  (2007)  show  that  achiev-
ing preservation with three different 
tax policies and a zoning policy can 
have very different, important finan-
cial impacts on communities. Policy 
makers thus should carefully evaluate 
the various means of reaching pres-
ervation goals and not automatically 
exclude the possibility of using regu-
lations.
Philosophically, there is a danger 
that policymakers will treat amenity 
values as indisputably objective sim-
ply because they are precise and gen-
erated through a complicated, statis-
tical process. Yet amenity values are 
calculated using a process with subtle 
value judgments. Valuation research-
ers pose survey questions in terms of 
a respondent’s willingness to pay for 
amenities because it has been shown 
to be the best way to ask about hy-
pothetical market behavior. However, 
this does not mean that the public 
should be buying amenity services in 
all circumstances. Some policies, such 
as PACE, imply that development is 
a  landowner’s  property  right  (Duke 
and  Lynch  2006;  Legg  2007).  Ac-
tual land–use decisions, however, are 
largely  directed  by  zoning.  Zoning 
laws dictate permissible land uses at 
a given time—they do not necessarily 
define property rights.
It  is  a  value  judgment  whether 
or not the public should take on a 
buyer–type role (PACE, fee simple) 
or a seller–type role (impact fees) in 
preservation transactions (Duke and 
Lynch 2006; Legg 2007). Similarly, it 
is a value judgment whether current 
land–use rules should be altered via 
rezoning.  Policymakers  are  advised 
to seek the guidance of local politi-
cal bodies and stakeholders in mak-
ing these judgments. Amenity values 
from economists can help suggest pri-
orities, but should not automatically 
and uncritically be used to dictate a 
specific policy process.
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